DAY 35 · PROPOSAL 34 · PART XV · POLICY 37

Rapidly Expand Detention Capacity.

Build capacity quickly. Protect welfare. Keep asylum decisions in public hands.

The core idea

Manifesto 1.1 proposes rapidly expanding immigration detention capacity.

Private security and infrastructure companies may build and operate facilities, but only through strict government contracts with enforceable standards, inspection and public accountability.

Tax and Business Rate incentives may be linked to delivery, security, welfare standards and contract performance.

Private contractors would not determine asylum claims or make removal decisions. Those responsibilities would remain government functions.

Contractors may build and operate. Government alone decides asylum claims and removal outcomes.

The proposed delivery model

Private construction

Use specialist infrastructure capacity to bring suitable facilities into service more quickly.

Strict public contracts

Set binding requirements for safety, security, welfare, staffing, transparency and contract performance.

Targeted incentives

Test tax and Business Rate support against measurable public value, additional capacity and successful delivery.

Regulated operation

Require licensing, independent inspection, transparent reporting and enforceable remedies when standards are not met.

Public decisions

Keep asylum casework, legal determinations and removal decisions with accountable government bodies.

Welfare protection

Guarantee healthcare, safeguarding, legal access, complaints procedures and humane living conditions.

Conditions that must be non-negotiable

Additional capacity cannot become a substitute for timely casework, lawful decisions or alternatives to detention.

Any privately built or operated estate must remain subject to public law, ministerial accountability and independent oversight.

  • Define the legal basis, purpose and review periods for every detained person.
  • Establish enforceable standards for accommodation, food, sanitation, exercise, communication and personal dignity.
  • Provide timely physical and mental healthcare with appropriate clinical independence.
  • Identify children, trafficking survivors, torture survivors, pregnant people and those with serious illnesses at the earliest opportunity.
  • Protect confidential access to legal advice, interpreters, evidence and routes to challenge detention.
  • Give independent inspectors unrestricted access and publish their findings and required corrective actions.
  • Require staff vetting, appropriate training, safe staffing levels, whistleblowing protection and professional standards.
  • Publish contracts, payments, capacity, occupancy, complaints, serious incidents, use of force and welfare outcomes.

An unresolved design choice

Manifesto 1.0 included “successful removals” as an additional incentive criterion.

Manifesto 1.1 does not automatically adopt that criterion and records the difference as unresolved.

Before any decision, scrutiny must test whether outcome-based payments could create perverse incentives, weaken individual safeguards or blur the boundary between contractors and government decision-makers.

No contractor should decide who receives asylum or who is removed.

Costing capacity honestly

The master manifesto records an indicative annual envelope of £1–2 billion for the immigration system as a whole.

This is not a final cost for Policy 37 and must not be presented as one.

Additional detention capacity would involve land, planning, construction, finance, staffing, healthcare, security, maintenance, inspection and contract-management costs that must be modelled separately.

Indicative system-wide envelope: £1–2 billion a year—not a final cost for Policy 37.

Costs and capacity that must be modelled

  • Land, location, planning consent, transport links, utilities, environmental impact and pressure on local services.
  • Facility design, secure construction, equipment, financing, commissioning and long-term maintenance.
  • Recruitment, vetting, training, pay, supervision, retention and safe staffing ratios.
  • Healthcare, mental-health provision, safeguarding, interpreters, food, activities and communication facilities.
  • Perimeter security, access systems, incident response, secure records and cyber protection.
  • Government contract management, independent inspection, complaints systems, legal access and enforcement action.

A staged delivery test

Need

Publish demand forecasts and demonstrate why additional detention capacity is required rather than relying on realistic alternatives.

Options

Compare public construction, private delivery, refurbishment of existing facilities and non-custodial alternatives.

Pilot

Test a limited procurement model before authorising national expansion or long-term financial incentives.

Exit and failure

Plan for contractor failure, emergency transfers, government step-in rights and the safe closure of facilities.

Questions for scrutiny

  • How much additional detention capacity is genuinely required under different arrival and casework scenarios?
  • Which people should never be detained, and what vulnerability screening must occur before placement?
  • What legal time limits, automatic reviews and alternatives to detention should apply?
  • Which locations are suitable when healthcare, legal access, transport, workforce availability and community impact are considered?
  • Should facilities be publicly built, privately built, privately operated or delivered through a mixed model?
  • What minimum staffing, training, healthcare, welfare and safeguarding standards must contracts require?
  • How should tax and Business Rate incentives be valued, capped, time-limited and recovered when delivery fails?
  • Which performance measures would improve delivery without rewarding detention volume or creating perverse incentives?
  • Should “successful removals” ever affect contractor payments, and how would individual rights and decision-making independence be protected?
  • What information should be published about contracts, occupancy, incidents, complaints, use of force and costs?
  • What inspection powers, penalties, government step-in rights and termination clauses are required when standards fail?
  • What are the capital and annual operating costs, and how would they fit within the £1–2 billion system-wide envelope?
Expand lawful capacity quickly without outsourcing public decisions or human rights.

The proposed direction

Proposal 34 would allow private security and infrastructure companies to build and operate immigration detention facilities under strict government contracts.

Potential tax and Business Rate incentives would be tested against construction speed, additional capacity, security, welfare standards and contract performance.

Asylum claims and removal decisions would remain government functions.

Final policy must define lawful detention, protect vulnerable people, prevent perverse incentives and follow transparent procurement, independent inspection and full costing.

Source basis: Manifesto 1.1, Part XV, Policy 37, “Immigration detention capacity”, Major Promise 34—Rapidly Expand Detention Capacity, and Budget 3.1. The £1–2 billion figure is an indicative annual envelope for the immigration system as a whole, not a settled cost for this proposal.

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